Brian's Blog

The seemingly innocuous decision of Anglo Irish Bank to change its year-end from September to December, presumably with the approval of the Minister for Finance and "public interest" board members, is a striking example of the Government's opaqueness and Machiavellian approach to the banking crisis and Nama. This date change means that the State-owned bank can hide the full extent of its problems until 2011.

Meantime, the Government has gifted almost €4 billion of taxpayers' money to the bank for absolutely no return and will probably need to flush a further €4-6 billion down its plug hole. This is additional to the estimated €28.4 billion of loans to be transferred to Nama. The State is knowingly paying over the odds for the privilege of handling these loans to the extent of, maybe, €3-6 billion.

On this basis, Anglo is going to cost the Irish taxpayer anything between €8 and €16 billion. This means that up to 15 months of all income tax collected in the State could be used to pay for the reckless behaviour of Anglo's management and some of its clients.

Nama's draft business plan projects a profit of €5.5 billion by 2020 even after overpaying €7 billion for loans and incurring expenses of €2.6 billion. Surely, this forecast undermines the need for Nama. In truth, the plan's projections are undoubtedly "very best case" and other scenarios should have been published using lower repayments and interest income, higher defaults etc. These scenarios would explain why the banks are so enthusiastic about passing all their property loans to Nama.

Letter published in the Sunday Business Post on 1st November 2009.

What is the point of the Dail debating the Nama Bill before Nama has undertaken basic research on its prospective loan portfolio and finalised its business plan and strategies? If Nama's draft plan was used to seek €54,000 from investors, it would be rejected out of hand as an extremely poor document. Given that Nama needs to effectively raise an amount which is a million times larger i.e €54,000,000,000, surely no taxpayers' money should be provided until its plan has been fully researched and approved by the Dail. Only at that point would it be appropriate to resume consideration of the Nama Bill. Thoughts of horses, carts and stable doors come to mind.

Letter published in the Sunday Business Post on 8th November 2009.

Our general criticisms of Nama's draft business plan are presented in Nama - A Flawed Business Plan.

This posting raises basic questions and concerns about the plan's underlying default rate and treatment of rolled up interest. These could have huge implications for the plan's credibility; the likely depth and duration of the banking/building crisis; and the cost of Nama to taxpayers.

In summary, detailed analysis of Nama's cashflow projections suggests that the "real" default rate is either an unrealistically low 6% or a catastrophically high 34% depending on the treatment of rolled up interest arising over the ten years to 2020. This compares with a 20% rate quoted in Nama's plan.

Instead of debating the Nama Bill, the Dail and Seanad should undertake a more indepth review of Nama's business plan. Bottom line: no taxpayers' money or support should be forthcoming until its plan has been fully researched and presented in final form for approval.

Our detailed assessment is presented in the five sections below. They review Nama's projections, highlight concerns, pose questions, explain implications and present general conclusions. 

Nama's draft business plan is merely a work in progress and no taxpayers' money should be invested until the plan has been fully researched, presented in final form and approved by the Dail.

If the plan was used to seek €54,000 from investors, it would be rejected as an extremely poor document. Given that it is being used to raise a million times more, no taxpayers' money should be invested until the plan has been fully researched, presented in final form and approved by the Dail.

As developer of financial projection software with a user base in over a hundred countries, I'd like to comment on Nama's 10-year projections as follows:

1. The discount rate used to convert future cashflows to present-day values is 5 percent. This corresponds to the current rate, presumably risk-free, for Government bonds. If a more realistic rate of, say, 15 percent is used to partly counter the plan's rosy assumptions, the projected net cash value drops from €4.8 billion to €3.7 billion for the ten years.
   
   
2. Every business plan, especially one involving an investment of €54 billion of taxpayers' money, should include projected P&L statements and balance sheets as well as cashflow forecasts for each year. This would present the full picture and facilitate ratio analyses which might help anticipate problems similar to those experienced by very same banks that Nama is trying to rescue.
   
   
3. Given the huge uncertainties, projections for less favourable scenarios, based on the plan's own risk assessments, should have been published. These would facilitate the development of defensible strategies and mini-max assessments (to minimise the maximum regret that might be anticipated once the final outcome is known) as well as Monte Carlo simulations to take account of the compounding effect of risk. 
   
   
4. The projections assume modest principal repayments during the initial three years and a surge in repayments during the final seven years. If over half of all borrowers cannot pay any interest during the initial years, what are the chances that property markets will recover sufficiently to facilitate repayment of loans as well as rolled up interest in later years?
   
   
5. The plan forecasts a profit of €5.5 billion by 2020. Surely, this forecast undermines the need for Nama and begs the question as to why the banks' shareholders are not lining up to get a share of the action. In truth, the plan's projections are "very best case" and other scenarios should be published based on lower repayments and interest income, higher defaults, higher debt interest and expenses and a higher discount rate. These would be more realistic and explain why the banks are enthusiastic about Nama.
   
   
6. After market risk, the greatest challenge facing Nama relates to management. To succeed, its resources and expertise must be appropriate to one of the largest property portfolios in the world. This means experience of world-scale asset recovery and portfolio management with minimal reliance on inexperienced local secondments, expensive advisers and delegation of nothing but basic administrative activities back to covered institutions. According to its plan, Nama's inhouse staff of under a hundred people people will be managing a highly fragmented, complex portfolio worth €77 billion covering 20,500 loans linked to almost 2,000 developers' business plans.
   
   
7. The business plan explores six alternative scenarios. Only one of these is linked to Nama's operational performance and the trading environment and indicates that Nama would only break even if a default rate of 31% is used. The other five relate to interest rate trends and indicate that the impacts will be either negligible or highly unlikely. Extraordinarily, no attempt was made to assess the impact of any of the eight risk factors detailed in the business plan.
   
   
8. The plan contains no assessments of likely economic conditions over the next ten years to provide a basis for its projections regarding loan defaults and repayments. Notwithstanding this, the Government has already decided that the long-term outlook justifies paying €7 billion more than the market value of the properties linked to the loans to be repaid over the next decade.
   
   
9. The plan makes no reference whatsoever to the creation and role of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) which will be majority private-owned and play a pivital role in the execution of Nama's plans. Does Nama's right hand know what the left one is doing?

Instead of discussing the Nama Bill, the Dail should undertake an indepth review of Nama's business plan. 

Nama's business plan was published last night. It is of particular interest as my business specialises in business planning and financial projections. Having seen hundreds of plans and projections, I have learnt to take most projections looking beyond 2-3 years with a pinch of salt.

Nama's plan projects a profit of €5.5 billion by 2020 even after overpaying €7 billion for loans and incurring expenses of €2.6 billion. This is absolutely incredible and laughable if it was not so serious.

Surely, these glowing projections undermine the need for Nama and beg the question as to why the banks' shareholders are not lining up to get a share of the action. In truth, the plan's projections are "best case" and, as a specialist in business planning, I'd advocate a much more conservative set of numbers with lower repayments and interest income, higher defaults, higher debt interest and expenses and a higher discount rate. This scenario would be much more realistic and would explain why the banks are so enthusiastic about Nama.

Having originated the Double/Double/Half Rule (double time, double costs and half revenues), I'll like to see it applied to the Nama projections.

More seriously, an independent review of the plan's projections is essential before any further steps are taken. I'd love to see Justice Clarke of the High Court review the plan in the light of his devastating assessment of the financial projections accompanying the Zoe Group companies' application for examinership.

The current outrage about politicians' expenses is well justified and must lead to a complete reform incorporating a vouched system and lower expense rates (e.g. for attending the Dail). The message to politicians is that they should stop arguing, fix it and then move on as there are much bigger fish to fry.

Preoccupation with politicians' expenses and the million euro payment to a former FAS executive should be contrasted with the proposed payment by Nama to the banks. This is 54,000 times greater.

To put this in context, a million euro of €10 notes laid end-to-end would stretch from O'Connell Street to Howth whereas the Nama payment could be wrapped 17 times around the earth at its widest point. Given the magnitude of Nama and the limited information available (we know much more about the Ceann Comhairle's expenses), surely the Dail should spend more time discussing the principles of Nama rather than the minutiae of the bill. An expert-supported, forensic examination of Nama and its proposed pricing methods might help close the stable door before, rather than after, Nama bolts.

Also, compare the FAS furore with the deafening silence and absence of sanctions surrounding current and former ministers, bank directors and senior banking, public sector and regulatory executives for leading the entire economy to the edge of a precipice and then demanding that everyone else pays for their incompetence.

The Government should introduce a measure for Ireland similar to the Lisbon Treaty's Citizens' Initiative whereby at least a million EU citizens from several member States could request the EU Commission to bring forward proposals on a particular issue.

Based on the Lisbon model, about ten thousand Irish citizens from, say, six counties could oblige the Cabinet or Dail to consider an issue, or the Government to hold a referendum. Apparently, such a proposal was included in a draft of the 1922 Constitution of the Free State. Citizens' initiatives operate in Switzerland, New Zealand, Estonia and the US. A measure along these lines might help bridge the yawning gap between our politicians and the electorate.

Letter published in the Irish Times on 6th October 2009.

The following message about Nama was sent on 4th October to all TDs and Senators as a follow up to that sent on 28th August. Several recipients pledged to raise the suggestions in the Dail or at the Committee stage of the Nama Bill. Whether any of them make it into law remains to be seen.

On 28th August, I wrote to you signifying my deep concerns about Nama. In the event that Nama proceeds in its present form, I wish to offer the following suggestions to help enhance public trust and improve its effectiveness:

1. Whistleblowers' Charter

The Nama Bill covers corruption, acting in bad faith, conflicts of interest, lobbying as well as failures to comply with obligations. It also provides for extensive reports, audits and accountability. Provision should also be made for a whistleblowers' charter to cover staff within Nama, covered institutions, debtors, advisers and service providers so as to help ensure that these parties all operate to the highest professional and ethical standards.

2. Reporting on Policy Matters

As the incumbent Minister for Finance will effectively control a €90 billion property empire and as several individuals of different political hues could fill this role over the life of Nama, robust checks and balances are essential to ensure that these ministers cannot use Nama in any manner at variance with its original purpose. To see how easily this can happen, consider Nama's sister body, the National Pension Reserve Fund which was set up to develop an international investment portfolio over a twenty-year horizon. Eureka, at the Minister's direction it now holds €7 billion of Irish bank shares amounting to a third of its total assets. Sections in the Nama Bill preclude its Chairman and CE from discussing policy matters with Oireachtas Committees. As things stand, these committees could be prevented from raising major issues, such as pricing of asset sales, on the grounds that these are policy matters. These sections should be removed and senior management should have unrestricted access to Oireachtas Committees.

3. Management Resources

After market risk, the key variable determining the success of a venture is usually managerial risk. In Nama's case, the former will be addressed largely by the size of the so-called haircut. To address the latter, Nama's senior management team must have extensive direct experience of world-scale asset recovery and portfolio management. Reliance on local secondments, expensive advisers and delegation of anything but basic administrative activities back to covered institutions should be minimised. The proposed staffing of Nama is only a fraction of that used by the Swedish "bad" bank operation which dealt exclusively with nationalised banks and had a loan portfolio far smaller than Nama's. It appears that Nama's inhouse staff of under a hundred people people will be managing a highly fragmented, complex portfolio worth €77 billion and covering 20,500 loans linked to almost 2,000 developers' business plans. Such an approach is penny wise and pounds foolish and is equivalent to sending a boy on a man's errant. Accordingly, the management resources and expertise within Nama must be appropriate to managing one of the largest property portfolios in the world even if this entails much higher operating costs than envisaged to date.

Thank you for reading this. I would welcome feedback or comments but please don't simply reply with a canned response or by enclosing any more general policy documents about Nama.

Supplementary documentation published by the Department of Finance alongside the Nama Bill about property yields contains some extraordinary statements (starting on page 10):

• It indicates that property yields (rents as percentage of prices) are higher in Dublin (7.25 percent) than in other major European cities and that Dublin's yield is well above its 20-year average of 5.6 percent.
  
  
• It then states that as "yields move towards their long term average this would indicate an increase in property prices". To re-enforce this view, it expects the exceptionally large difference between property yields in Ireland and key euro interest rates to narrow as a result of rising interest rates or rising property prices!!!
  

Whilst acknowledging that property prices have fallen by almost 50% in the past few years, the document completely ignores the possibility that the exceptional yields may be anticipating a sharp decline in rents. It not so long ago that the Irish banks offered unprecedented double-figure dividend yields before they were obliged to suspend dividends and their shares collapsed.

Furthermore, the Government could be accused of conspiring with Nama by not implementing legislation to permit downward rent reviews for commercial leases, as has happened already in the residential sector. This has the effect of artificially underpinning high property yields and thereby supporting property prices for the benefit of Nama, the banks and their developer friends. 

Hopefully, the European Commission is taking note of the Government's and Nama's approach to property valuation and their use of taxpayers' hands to catch falling knives.

Four questions about Nama:

1. Why is the onus on Irish taxpayers to recapitalise the main banks via Nama? These banks could raise substantial capital by selling off non-core investment and insurance activities and holdings in banks in the UK, Poland and the US. 
   
   
2. Why is the Minister preoccupied with the capital requirements of the banks when determining the haircut on loans being transferred to Nama? Surely, this amounts to match-fixing with taxpayers on the losing team.
   
   
3. Will the Minister accept that property values could continue falling for the next few years and might not rise for several years thereafter? This would be a consequence of the overhang created by Nama's portfolio, rising interest rates and ultra-conservative bank lending.
   
   
4. Why doesn't the Government direct the banks to grant share options to mortgage holders experiencing negative equity? This would help compensate them for the failures by the Government, Regulator and banks to exercise judgement and prudential control during the boom which they provoked.

Lead letter published in the Irish Times on 17th September 2009.

A shorter letter from the Ceann Comhairle to the electorate incorporating the words "sorry" and "resign" would have been more appropriate.

Letter published in the Irish Times on 16th September 2009.

The 1911 Census required householders to state the number of front-facing windows in their dwellings.

Instead of asking householders to value their houses in a very uncertain market, the proposed property tax could be based on a windows count.

How about a tax of €100 per front-facing window or one-third of total windows which ever is the greater? It would be very easy for Revenue to check this and evasion by bricking up windows should be evident.

A window tax was used in the UK and France in the 19th century as an alternative to income tax and gave rise to the phrase "daylight robbery".

Letter published in Irish Times on 9th September 2009.

The property market is in the doghouse simply because, as dogs on the street know, prices have to fall considerably further to make long-term economic sense based on yields and prospective interest rate increases.

Clearly the Government is not listening as it strives to ensure that Nama will be able to exploit its dominant market position to keep prices artificially high for the benefit of bank shareholders, bondholders and developers. Surely this amounts to price rigging and State subsidisation and is contrary the public interest.

The following message was sent to all TDs and Senators on 28th August 2009. It was acknowledged by about forty recipents who mainly supplied canned responses with attachments about party policies.

I'm very concerned about the Government's approach to resolving the banking crisis and wish to make the following points to you as a public representative in the hope that you can influence or lobby the Government:

1. As the economy moves through an unprecedented recession, all possible measure should taken to ensure that credit is readily available for viable projects and credit-worthy borrowers. It is impossible to see how this can be done by a lame-duck banking system which is being pulled in several directions - to lend more, protect shareholder value, ration credit to improve ratios, hoard resources to cover bad debts, and make guarantee and recapitalisation payments to the state. 
   
   
2. While the Minister for Finance views bank nationalisation as the "last resort", he must also appreciate that the main banks continue to operate thanks to the State's guarantees for €400 billion, its €7 billion preference share investment, its plan to purchase €90 billion of their loans and, if needs be, to take equity stakes.
   
   
3. Nama is a huge gamble which exposes taxpayers to a multi-billion euro hit if prices paid for the loans prove to be too high. In these circumstances, the banks would emerge unscathed and their shareholders would make massive gains as the economy recovers. If you think that this couldn't happen, recall that an insurance levy paid for many years to bail out AIB after its ill-fated takeover of ICI. Note: This was incorrect - the levy related to the failure of PMPA.
   
   
4. As the Government has a responsibility to protect the banking system and taxpayers ahead of banking institutions or bankers, it is very hard to understand why it doesn't simply "bite the bullet" and temporarily nationalise the main banks as a central element of Nama's rescue mission. Given that it holds the whip hand, the Government could cut deals with bank stakeholders to ensure that gains and pains are shared more fairly.

Thank you for reading this.

Based on the draft Nama legislation, the Minister for Finance will effectively control a €90 billion property empire and, given Nama's expected life span, several individuals of different political hues could fill this position over the next decade.

This raises concerns about the robustness of checks and balances to ensure that these ministers don't use Nama for pet projects at variance with its original purpose. Couldn't happen?

Just look at Nama's sister body, the National Pension Reserve Fund which was set up to develop a high-grade, international investment portfolio over a twenty-year horizon. Suddenly, at the direction of the Minister for Finance, it has been stuffed with €7 billion of Irish bank shares amounting to a third of its total assets.

Any requirement that finance ministers account for Nama to the Oireachtas offers absolutely no solace based on that body's track record. Instead, the legislation must include overarching controls to ensure that Nama cannot become a ministerial sweet shop offering goodies like bail-outs, tax-breaks, benchmarking and decentalisation.

Why is the Government proposing to use Nama to prevent a decline in property prices at a time when Ireland has the second highest cost of living in the EU?

Surely, it should be encouraging lower prices as these would result in cheaper houses, lower shop prices and more competitive commercial and industrial rents. Instead, taxpayers are expected to underwrite a multi-billion punt on Nama to ensure that property prices don't fall and that the country remains uncompetitive.

Lead letter published in the Irish Times on 26th August 2009.

The CSO's recent review of economic and social progress for 2008 incorporates EU-wide comparisons based on GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and GNI (Gross National Income). For Ireland, these measures differ by about 14 percent. In many situations, the lower GNI is the most appropriate measure of Ireland's output as it excludes the huge profits generated by multinationals. However, comparative studies by the EU, OECD, IMF etc. are based on GDPs which for many countries are very close to their GNI values. Consequently, their findings over- or understate Ireland's true performance as illustrated by the following examples derived from the CSO's review and covering the 27 EU states:

• Ireland ranked second place in terms of purchasing power per person based on GDP but fell to fifth place based on GNI.
• For capital investment, Ireland jumped from 16th place based on GDP to a much more favourable 8th position based on GNI.
• Social protection expenditure based on GDP placed Ireland in 20th place. This improved to 15th based on GNI.
• For public expenditure on education, Ireland ranked 15th based on GDP but rose to a commendable 7th place for GNI.
• Ireland's ranking for public health expenditure jumped from 17th place when related to GDP to an above-average 11th place for GNI.

Surely, domestic and international studies should assess Ireland's performance based on GNI as well as GDP, even if only in footnotes. For example, the projected exchequer deficit for 2009 is 10.8 percent of GDP and extraordinarily high by international standards. If based on GNI, it rises to 12.7 percent and points to an even more serious position.

Letter published in the Sunday Business Post on 13th September 2009. The five examples were edited out for space reasons. 

Calls for a review of the minimum wage should be placed in context.

According to the 2007 National Employment Survey 14 percent of all employees in the State had hourly earnings below €10 while a similar percentage had earnings above €40 per hour.

When account is taken of hours worked, employees earning less than €250 a week account for only 4 percent of the national wage bill as compared with a 13.5 percent share for those earning over €1,500 a week. A ten percent reduction in wages for all 233,000 employees earning less than €250 a week would reduce the national payroll by 0.4 percent whereas a similar reduction for the 233,000 highest paid employees would reduce the national payroll by eight times as much.

For maximum impact, any campaign to improve national wage competitiveness should start with high-paid employees, directors and self-employed rather than the lowest paid. To show leadership, our politicians should take substantial reductions in salaries which, even after minor tweaking, are still amongst the highest in the world.

Letter published in the Sunday Business Post on 16th August 2009. 

In discussing the need for strong oversight of Nama, Noel Whelan (1st August) mentioned that the draft legislation provides for a special Oireachtas committee to oversee Nama in addition to the Public Accounts Committee.

I wonder how effective these committees will be given that the draft legislation contains clauses (50 and 51) which preclude the Chief Executive Officer and the Chairperson of the board of Nama from (a) questioning or expressing an opinion on the merits of any policy of the Government or a Minister or on the merits of the objectives of such a policy or (b) producing a specified document in which the Chief Executive Officer or the Chairperson questions or expresses an opinion on the merits of any such policy or such objectives.

Surely, these "gagging clauses" will preclude key officials from speaking openly on fundamental issues and effectively nobble comprehensive scrutiny of Nama.

Letter published in Irish Times on 4th August 2009.

The Minister for Finance told the Dail on Wednesday last that the unemployment rate will hit 15.5 percent next year. This compares with 11.4 per cent last month and just 5.4 percent for April 2008. Unemployment is expected to reach 366,000 during 2010. This is almost 60% higher than the highest level encountered during the dark eighties - it can be no consolation to the unemployed that the labour force has increased substantially in the interval.

If public sector employment remains steady at 360,000 then private sector will continue to bear the brunt of unemployment. This will bring the sector's unemployment rate to almost 19% notwithstanding across-the-board wage freezes and reductions, impaired pensions and substantial rationalisation.

It begs the question as to why, in this unprecedented crisis, the public sector continues to enjoy a substantial like-for-like wage premium, excellent pension arrangements (notwithstanding the recent levy) and near absolute job security. Surely, it is time for the entire public sector to engage, without preconditions, in a major programme of reform and productivity improvement to align itself more closely with the private sector.

For its part, the Government and opposition should set aside their petty party differences and lead an immediate action plan to contain unemployment, reduce public expenditure, unblock the banking system, protect the least well-off and restore medium-term confidence and competitiveness.

In parallel, the social partners parties must get off their ideological high horses; accept that a substantial across-the-board decline in living standards is inevitable; and start working with the Government to ensure that the major surgery needed to restore the economy's health is executed as fairly as possible. The quicker this is done the sooner the recovery can start.

This Government is quite clever in the way that it periodically creates smoke screens to distract from underlying issues. The latest example is reshuffling junior ministers to hide gross excesses in the remuneration and expenses of politicians. Clearly, the Government has used a feather duster instead of a chain saw notwithstanding that it promised in the last budget to "lead by example".

Of course, this is not surprising given that, apart from a few sacrificial lambs, none of the hundred or so individuals in the public and private sectors who led the economy over a cliff have suffered meaningful sanctions or even offered unqualified apologies.

All the signs are that the economy will decline by about 14% between mid-2008 and 2010 and that only about one-third of this decline may have already occurred. This is confirmed by the expectation that the tax increases announced in April will have to be repeated, in one form or another, in budgets for 2010 and 2011.

On this basis the worst has yet to come. The Government's most recent initiative has been to scuffle a few meaningless jobs instead of showing real leadership to drive through root-and-branch changes to reduce public expenditure, sort out the banking system and restore medium-term confidence and competitiveness. When those fortunates with jobs see the impact of higher levies on their pay slips at end May, they will be in no mood to tolerate a Government that pussy foots around the excesses of the Celtic tiger and fails to "lead by example".

A rout of the governing parties in the local and European elections could easily provoke a crisis of confidence within the Dail and lead, for better or worse, to an early general election. This time around, the electorate should ensure that it votes for a government that leads from the front and is both firm and fair.

Mr X (April 16th) is shocked that so many innumerates are advocating nationalisation of the banks. The real innumerates are the bankers and policy makers who ignored long-term trends. The Government's approach to the banking system is the financial equivalent of half-pregnancy as it involve nationalisation of bad loans and continuing privatisation of good loans. Even at this late stage, it should go the whole hog and nationalise the main banks. Reasons for not doing so, such as the need for transparency, coming from a totally opaque Government are pure hogwash.

Nationalisation would remove uncertainty, simplify matters, restore confidence and ensure that state funding is used to boost the economy rather than bale out bank shareholders. It would be much less risky as it would eliminate the need to price impossible-to-value impaired loans. These could cost taxpayers tens of billions if transferred at the wrong price to Nama in addition to billions of interest payable on bonds used to purchase the dodgy loans at the outset. The idea of applying a levy on the banks to offset any shortfalls is more hogwash as it will be simply passed on to customers.

Published in the Irish Times on 18th April 2009.

It is self evident that as the economy lurches into an ever deepening recession, every possible measure should taken to ensure that credit is readily available for viable projects and credit-worthy borrowers. It is just as evident that this cannot be done by a lame-duck banking system which is being pulled in several directions - to lend more, protect shareholder value, ration credit to improve ratios, hoard resources to cover future bad debts, and make guarantee and recapitalisation payments to the state. More ...

Your editorial (16th March) about Oireachtas reform stated that the question is not whether there should be cuts, but how deep cuts should go.

For starters, the Minister of Finance should announce an immediate reduction of about one-third in the salaries, pensions and other perks enjoyed by politicians and across the upper reaches of the public service. This might seem Draconian, but it would only deflate a big bubble and bring things into line with other comparable countries with which Ireland is expected to compete.

If the Government makes such an announcement on or before budget day, it will send the clearest possible signal to the electorate and international observers that it understands the seriousness of the situation and is leading by example.

If it fails to do so, there is every chance that it will not secure the electorate's support for the budget measures. In these circumstances, it is possible that even more painful medicine will be imposed unilaterally by the ECB or IMF as a precondition of a financial bailout.

Letter published in Irish Times on 23rd March 2009.

Last year the Minister for Finance advanced the 2009 budget by three months as the Government's main response to the emerging economic crisis. He indicated in his budget speech that the economy would decline by less than one per cent and unemployment would average 7.3 per cent in 2009.

If these figures justified an early budget, surely the expected 6+ per cent decline in the economy for 2009 and an actual unemployment rate of 7.7 per cent for last December justify immediate budgetary action rather than a fifteen month gap to the next budget.

Much play has been made by the Government that top earners pay the most tax and that huge numbers don't pay any tax. According to Revenue's Statistical Report for 2007, 661,000 tax cases had gross incomes of less than €15,000 a year and, as might be expected, paid minimal taxes totalling €14 million on gross incomes of €4,744 million.

If, ignoring the social consequences, their effective tax rate of 0.3% could be increased by 10% to 10.3%, an additional €474 million would be raised. At the other end of the spectrum, 81,000 people had gross incomes in excess of €100,000 a year and paid taxes totalling €4,353 million on gross incomes of €16,065 million. If their effective tax rate of 27% increased by the same 10% to 37%, a total of €1,606 million could be raised.

Surely, it is unnecessary to wait for the Commission on Taxation's report to see that, in this time of crisis, tax rates should be increased as soon as possible for those with the highest after-tax incomes.

Letter published in the Irish Times on 4th March 2009.

Last Monday, the Irish Times contained full-page advertisements from AIB and ICTU. The contrast between the two could not be greater.

The former comprised patronising guff about commitment (mentioned five times) which was undoubtedly generated by an advertising agency. The ICTU contribution was a measured document which addressed many of the problems confronting the state. Although far from perfect, it was close to being the type of comprehensive plan that the Government should have produced months ago.

The bank's advert stated that it is regulated by the Financial Regulator. Thankfully, the ICTU advert contained no such statement.

Letter published in the Irish Times on 20th February 2009.

There are clear signs that the proposed recapitalisation of the main banks will prove inadequate and that further support will be required from the Government in line with its minimalist "drip drip" strategy.

To protect the economy and banking system as distinct from banks and bankers, the Government should change tack before being forced to do so and withdraw their proposal in favour of the following variation on the "bad" bank approach. This would buy time and ensure that state funding is used exclusively for productive purposes. In addition, it would be less risky and costly for the taxpayer, eliminate the need for bad debt insurance, and remove pressures on the banks to withhold credit or hoard resources to cover future bad debts.

Here are some suggestions:

1. AIB and Bank of Ireland (combined market value of €0.86 billion) should be nationalised and their existing shareholders compensated mainly by options to acquire substantial new equity stakes when the two banks are eventually re-privatised.
   
   
2. Each nationalised bank should be divided into good and bad banks with new boards and senior management teams working exclusively in the public interest and insulated from political interference. The good banks should receive capital injections from the state to improve liquidity and operate using existing staff, premises etc. These banks could be very profitable as all their problematic loans would have been shunted into their bad banks.
   
   
3. The two bad banks should undertake no new business and, having secured minimal working capital from the state, would effectively operate as high-powered debt collectors. They would pursue borrowers for repayments and where necessary call in securities and, rather than engage in fire sales, accumulate such assets for sale once economic growth resumes. Repayments should be passed back to good banks to further enhance liquidity.
   
   
4. Once the crisis has passed, the final deficits attributable to the bad banks will be clear. These should be absorbed by the good banks which could then be refloated on the stock market to repay the state, grant equity to option holders and raise new capital.
   

The following proposals are aimed at those in leadership positions and the higher paid. While small in number, they are hugely important for setting example, restoring fairness to the tax system and contributing to the national finances and competitiveness.

1. Salaries, pensions and expenses of ministers, TDs and senators should be reduced by, at least, one-third and instead of being pegged to overblown civil service scales, their salaries should be linked to those of politicians in other states of comparable size and status, and having similar parliamentary sitting days.
   
   
2. Salary scales of senior administers and professionals across the public sector should also be benchmarked against opposite numbers in other comparable countries and linked to the average industrial wage. In the interests of fairness, the proposed pension levy should be restructured as was done for the income levy.
   
   
3. As applies in the US, exceptional salaries in the private sector should be funded by shareholders rather than subsidised by taxpayers. Accordingly, any elements of total salary, bonus and pension contribution exceeding €200,000 should cease to be deductable for corporation tax purposes.
   
   
4. The conditions applicable to non-residency for tax purposes should be reviewed so that non-residency means exactly what it says or tax exiles pay up like every other citizen. For starters, tax should be changed on worldwide incomes of tax exiles pro-rate to days (or part of) spent in the state.
   
   
5. Having been introduced to encourage greater participation in the work force, tax individualisation should be phased out to help distribute scarce jobs across more households. Dual-income households with high mortgages that voluntarily become single-income should get special tax credits or be able to extend the term of their mortgages.
   
   
6. A new tax rate of 48% should be applied to the 60,000 tax payers with incomes above €100,000 a year. The annual yield would be about €800 million, and could be higher if allowances for "top-hat" pensions, investments etc. are reduced. If applied immediately for the next five years, these changes could cover about a quarter of the projected €16 billion shortfall.

Letter published in the Irish Times on 10th February 2009.

Nothing illustrates the Government's weak-kneed approach to the crisis more clearly than the fact that on the same day that President Obama demanded that US companies receiving bailouts should limit executive salaries to US$500,000, our Taoiseach who earns more than President Obama merely urged top executives in banks covered by tax payers' guarantees to take 25 per cent salary cuts. Arguably, a maximum salary of about €200,000 would be appropriate for Irish bank executives when account is taken of their size relative to their US counterparts

The Minister for Finance has stated that the €5.5 billion package for the banks is a good deal for the taxpayer. In reality, the return to the Exchequer is derisory given the risks involved, the cost of borrowing the funds for the package, and the fact that the proposed preference shares are neither convertible nor cumulative and have no priority over ordinary shares in the event of a liquidation.

In addition, the government has agreed to act as funder of last resort for the two main banks if their private fund-raising is unsuccessful and, most extraordinarily, it has offered Anglo Irish a blank cheque by agreeing "to make further capital available if required so that it remains a sound and viable institution". If this bank is sound and viable why does it need €1.5 billion of State funding and why is its share price sinking like a stone and valuing the entire bank at a mere fraction of this support?

All this largess comes on top of several hundred billion of guarantees which have increased interest costs for the state's own funding needs.

Surely, it is completely unacceptable for the very same people - ministers and bankers - who created the crisis to also negotiate the solution using "our" money. Where are the sanctions to ensure that their reckless behaviour is not repeated and why should the taxpayer shoulder all the risk and none of the rewards?

 Letter published in the Irish Times on 29th December 2008.

Given that the state is committing €5.5 billion to the banks using borrowed money sourced via the National Pension Reserve Fund, the net return to the Exchequer is really only two-thirds the proposed divided payments. The Minister for Finance has stated that the deal is a good one for the taxpayer. In reality, the return is derisory given the risks involved and the fact that the shares are neither convertible nor cumulative and have no priority over ordinary shares in the event of a liquidation.

In addition, the government has agreed to act as the funder of last resort for the two main banks in the event that their private fund raising is unsuccessful and, most extraordinarily, it has offered Anglo a blank cheque "to make further capital available if required so that it remains a sound and viable institution". This begs the question as to why it needs €1.5 billion from the taxpayer if it is already sound and viable. All this largess comes on top of several hundred billion of guarantees which have already increased interest costs for the state's own funding needs.

Notwithstanding the offer of billions which the Exchequer can ill afford, the combined market value of the three banks has sunk by a half billion over the past week. This speaks volumes and suggests that another, even larger, funding round will be required next year as the economic decline accelerates, unemployment rises and property prices tank.

As further preference shares will no longer be an option, the government will be forced to do then what it should have done at the outset, namely, nationalise the banks, reform them into three distinctive banking entities with new balance sheets and management and then refloat them on the stock market to raise further capital and ensure that taxpayers benefit from the upturn.

The blame for the domestic banking crisis can be laid squarely at the foot of the Government, Financial Regulator, Central Bank, bank directors and some property developers.

Where is the "moral hazard" to ensure that their reckless behaviour is not repeated and why should the taxpayer shoulder all the risk and none of the rewards when the perpetrators of this debacle continue to enjoy enormous salaries and other perks?

Given that the economy will contract by a massive 4% next year and that State's guarantees to the six banks will expire just a year later, delays in restructuring the banks are simply making matters much worse for shareholders, borrowers and the economy.

Instead of inviting management of the banks to reluctantly submit proposals for rationalisation and recapitalisation, the government should take off its gloves and exercise real leadership by appealing directly to shareholders and announcing cash offers, based on current share prices, to temporarily nationalise the quoted banks.

To ensure acceptance by all six guaranteed banks, it should make it patently clear that the State's existing guarantees cannot be extended and that a special levy, or other sanctions, will be applied to any profits of banks which don't accept the offer. The acquisitions would cost about €4 Bn and warrants should be issued to existing bank shareholders so that they benefit from the restructuring.

On acceptance of the offers, the government should form three distinctive banking entities with realistic balance sheets and new boards and senior management teams. They should be seeded with mezzanine finance from institutional and private equity sources and immediately refloated on the stock market to raise a final round of new capital. The government could, if desired and appropriate, gradually reduce its holdings during the next decade.

Here are some suggestions for the Minister for Finance to consider when he is obliged by circumstances to present a supplementary budget early in the new year in response to the disastrous economic downturn which is still gathering momentum.

They should be implemented in the context of a realistic, attainable five-year plan for which the support of the social partners and opposition should be sought. Given that these are unlikely to acquiesce even though they offer no alternatives other than to strut, whine and oppose, the government should, for once, show real leadership and forge ahead on the grounds that there is no alternative and early action is crucial. Most people will accept pain provided it is seen to be fairly distributed and there is hope at the end of the tunnel. The alternative is much higher unemployment, cutbacks, emigration and extreme hardship which will take a decade to unwind.

As those who gained most from the Celtic Tiger should pay the most, the income levy percentages should be extended on a sliding scale from 0% for the lowest paid up to, say, 10% for those on the highest incomes. Alternatively, a new higher tax rate should be introduced for those earning more than, say, double the average industrial wage.

Given that payroll costs account for half of all public sector expenditure where salary rates are well ahead of equivalents in the private sector and internationally, the Government should roll back the first benchmarking exercise and plead "inability to pay" other than to the lowest earners under the new national wage agreement. It should only recommence payment of increases once major reforms have been confirmed by An Bord Slash.

Taxpayers can no longer be asked to subside "gold plated" pensions for politicians and public servants when the value of their own pensions (if they have one) is dropping through the floor. The Government should establish a realistically funded contributory pension scheme in lieu of the present prohibitively expensive and inequitable "pay-as-you-go" arrangement. As a stop gap, full PRSI should be applied across the public sector and, in recognition that PRSI is income tax in all but name, earnings limits should be removed for all workers in the private sector.

The foregoing measures will arrest the catastrophic deterioration in public finances and enable the new standard VAT rate of 21.5% to be reduced substantially. This will help the lower paid as well as assisting tourism and curtailing cross-border shopping.

Finally, the Dail should immediately start sitting for four full days every week for at least forty weeks a year. To ensure genuine debate and better decision making, backbenchers should be pressurised by constituents to exercise greater freedom of expression in Dail debates, and voting linked to constituents' needs rather than party loyalties should become the norm rather than the exception.

Lead letter published by Irish Times on 8th December 2008.

Our public representatives in Leinster House should get their own house in order before throwing stones about expenses and wasting money.

TDs enjoy some of the highest salaries in the world for sitting in the Dail for less time than opposite numbers in most other countries. These assemblies which operate for under two days a weeks are grossly over manned and hopelessly inefficient and ineffective due to archaic procedures and conventions.

TDs enjoy excellent allowances and related perks which are not necessarily taxed or even vouched for. On top of that, they have extraordinary pension deals and are free to employ relatives at the taxpayers' expense. They throw patronage around like confetti by creating non-jobs for many Minsters of State and Committee chairpersons and appointing friends and camp followers to the boards of hundreds of quanoes which are often used to shield them from accountability.

If our representatives were paid on the basis of results, they would now be hugely indebted to the taxpayer.

Maybe, they would reflect on their own value-for-money during the forthcoming six-week Dail recess.

This letter was published in the Irish Times on 28th November 2008. 

Has the Government learnt nothing from Eircom's experience in the hands of private equity investors and venture capitalists? It now seems to be wrapping up some of the Irish banks to facilitate a new game of pass the parcel using another key national resource.

Why doesn't the Government simply create a special investment vehicle to borrow the funds needs to recapitalise the banks via high-coupon preference shares and then do a public floatation of this vehicle to repay these borrowings?

This would allow the banks stay in, largely, Irish hands, give the Government a say over credit policies and ensure that banking strategies are aligned with the national interest rather than dictated by the short termism of unregulated Wall Street funds which played a lead role in creating the current international crisis.

This letter was published in the Irish Times on 22nd November 2008.

It is clear that (a) the Mininster has underestimated the looming problems (b) taxpayers were braced to accept some pain provided it was seen as equitably distributed (c) reform of the public sector has become a priority and (d) failure to recapitalise the banking systems will lead to a credit famine.

Here are some suggestions to address these matters:

1. It is clear that the majority will pay for the excesses of the past few years even though only a small minority were the principal beneficiaries. On the basis that those who gained most should pay most, the income levy percentages should be extended on a sliding scale from 0% for the lowest paid up to, say, 10% for those on the very highest incomes and expanded, as a condition of retaining Irish citizenship, to the worldwide incomes of our tax exiles. These changes should raise sufficient revenue to roll back the budget cuts and tax increases impacting on young, old and weak.
   
   
2. Extremely high salaries should be subsidised by shareholders rather than by taxpayers, To this end,  the Finance Bill should disallow any elements of total salary, bonus and pension contribution exceeding, say, 15 times the average industrial wage (c. €600,000) from being tax deductable.
   
   
3. Payroll costs account for about half of all public sector expenditure and salary rates are well ahead of their equivalents in the private sector and abroad. To help reduce costs, restore parity and reduce future borrowings, the Government should plead "inability to pay" other than to the lowest earners under the proposed new national wage agreement.
   
   It should only agree to recommence payment of increases post-rationalisation and -restructuring as guided by the forthcoming report on the Task Force on Public Service.
   
   
4. The scale of the looming pensions problem is evidenced by the sharp declines in the National Pension Reserve Fund and private sector funds, the poor uptake of pensions by the unpensioned and the surging cost of public sector pensions.
   
   Taxpayers with low/no pensions should not be required to subside "gold plated" pensions for politicians and public servants. The Government should immediately initiate a realistically funded contributory pension scheme in lieu of the present prohibitively expensive and inequitable "pay-as-you-go" arrangement.
   
   
5. The National Treasury Management Agency should immediately acquire substantial stakes in the quoted Irish banks to recapitalise them as insurances against defaults linked to the State guarantees and in anticipation of their profit declines over the next few years.
   
   Alternatively, the NPRF should liquidate some of its overseas holdings to acquire these stakes on the grounds that if our banking system fails the funding of pensions for two decades hence becomes academic. Of course, the annual payments of 1% of GNP, financed by borrowings, to the NPRF should be suspended immediately.
   

Having provided guarantees to the banks on very favourable terms, the Government must follow these up with equity injections, as is being done in many other countries, in order to underpin our fragile banking system, re-enforce its guarantees and participate in the upswing which will ultimately occur.

While this will impact on Exchequer borrowing, massively dilute existing shareholders and shred the reputations of many high-flyers, it is surely more prudent to inject new equity before problems arise rather than as the "the last option" favoured by the Minister for Finance.

If, God forbid, an Irish bank was to default on any significant scale, it is hard to see how the other banks could respond without jeopardising their own stability with disastrous national consequences.

To mangle a phrase often attributed to banks, the Government should lend them umbrellas before it rains and take them back once the sun starts shining.

This letter was published in the Sunday Business Post on 2nd November 2008.

The proposed income levy is a crude and inequitable method of raising revenue. Based on Revenue's latest published statistics, 855,000 taxpayers had incomes of less than €20,000 in 2006 and paid income taxes of €198 million on total incomes of €8.5 bn.

On this basis, the income levy of 1% would cost them €85 million. At the other end of the spectrum, 58,000 taxpayers earned over €100,000 and paid taxes of €3,320 million on total incomes of €10.1 bn. Application of the 1-2% levy would cost them €145 million.

This shows that the levy is equivalent to a 43% surcharge on income taxes paid by the lowest paid whereas it amounts to just 4% of income taxes for the highest paid.

If the levy scheme was changed to exclude those earning less then €20,000, the higher rate for the levy might, for example, have to be increased from 2% to 4% to generate the same overall revenue.

This would reduce their average incomes of €175,000 by €4,000 a year, hardly a large sacrifice in these who, by virtue of their high incomes, benefited most from the Celtic Tiger.

The value of the proposed bale out in the US is equivalent to US$2,000 per US citizen. The Irish bale out could be worth up to €125,000 per man, woman and child. If US citizens won't accept their bale out, why should we accept something a hundred times larger?

The Government's action is nothing more or less than a huge reward, underwritten by taxpayers, to banks for foolish lending, to the Regulator for failing to regulate, and to its beloved construction industry.

It does absolutely nothing to address the underling problems which the banks, government and construction industry jointly created over the last five years by building, selling and financing grossly over-priced houses and commercial property.

This is the AIB and ICI rescue repeating itself. Where are the restrictions on bankers remuneration? Where are the equity stakes? Why should Irish taxpayers guarantee to bale out a bank that stupidly financed an overpriced property development in Dublin, London or Germany or made billions by conspiring with house builders to lock hundreds of thousands of young purchasers in huge mortgages for the rest of their working lives?

Irish households are amongst the most heavily borrowed in the world and, instead of helping them, the Government gives guarantees worth a multiple of the Irish economy's annual output to the Irish banks.  This, on top of the hammering that households can expect in the forthcoming budget.

Lead letter published in the Irish Times on 1st October 2008.

The proposed new national wage agreement continues the practice of awarding percentage increases "across the board" with only a token nod to the lowest paid. This has helped make our ministers, TDs, and highest earning public sector managers and professionals amongst the best paid in the world and has progressively widened the income gap between low and high paid.

Using data from the CSO's National Employment Survey for 2006, the proposed agreement's impact on employees who account for 82% of the work force can be assessed as follows:

• Gross earnings of 1.7 million employees amounted to €63 billion and the proposed agreement would increase this by €3.8 billion (6.1%) if applied to all employees. 
• Because the proposed increases are percentages, lower paid employees would receive much smaller monetary gains. This means that about 233,000 workers earning less than €13,000 a year would share an increase of €173 million whereas the 75,000 employees earning over €75,000 a year would share about €466 million. Put another way, the lowest paid workers (14% of all employees) would get 5% of the cake while the much less numerous highest paid (4% of total) would get a 12% slice.
• The 0.5% "bonus" for the low-paid employees would be worth less €2 a week per worker. It would apply to about 500,000 workers but account for a mere 1% of the total proposed increase.

Aside from being inequitable, the proposed agreement ignores the fact that world economies are facing a possible serious recession and that, thanks to the excesses of the Celtic Tiger, our open economy has become completely uncompetitive. Given that the global credit crisis has yet to reach our real economy, a much more radical agreement is needed. For example, to restore competitiveness and social equity, the proposed percentages could be reassigned so that the lowest paid get the 6% and the highest get the 0.5% over the agreement's life. If applied on a sliding scale to all workers, the cost would be about €2 billion, just over half that of the proposed agreement.

Five years ago you published a letter from me about house prices (28th October 2003) which stated that "rising interest rates could move many recent and future buyers with large mortgages into negative equity and expose their lenders to defaulting loans. It could also mean that many houses acquired as investments might be offered for sale to lock in gains or to cut losses. This would further depress prices. Can nothing be done to prevent this calamitous event from happening?".

Clearly, very little was done. If a mere letter writer could foresee this crisis, why didn't the Government?

The best thing the Government can do now to assist the beleaguered building industry is absolutely nothing! House prices should be allowed continue their rapid descent to a point where people and lenders become confident that they have finally reached a reasonable and sustainable level.

There should be no dig outs or artificial schemes as these will merely defer decisions by those who would wish to purchase a quarter of a million houses over the next five years. The return of affordable housing for all would be real shot in the arm for society and the economy.

To consolidate this, the Government must introduce much-discussed controls on the price of building land and, in conjunction with the Central Bank, implement measures which curtail inflationary lending for house purchases.

Letter published in the Irish Times on 10th September 2008.

The National Pension Reserve Fund has lost about €3 billion (15% of value) over the past four quarters as a consequence of the international credit crisis.

In these circumstances, it makes no sense for the Exchequer to continue borrowing about €1.6 billion a year from abroad for the Fund to continue to making risky overseas investments while cutting back on domestic investment and turning to expensive Private-Public Partnerships and massive tax breaks to progress critical national projects.

This nonsense is compounded by the fact that the Fund must achieve a return on its investments in excess of the cost of borrowing "to wash its face". It is noteworthy that the NPRF is one of the few funds in the world not financed by oil and commodity revenue surpluses. Has the government forgotten the rules about never borrowing money to buy shares or investing what you cannot afford?

Surely it makes more sense for borrowings earmarked for the Fund to be redirected immediately to finance much-needed, major infrastructural projects now instead of being used to make overseas investments for pensions payable decades hence. This could be done simply by legislating a "contributions holiday", say, for three-years to free up about €5 billion.

This would enable critical projects to be progressed more quickly and kept in public ownership. For example, the eight co-located hospitals which will cost the taxpayer a fortune and further fragment our two-tier health service could be progressed in public ownership using a fraction of these liberated funds.

By 2025, the NPRF could be valued €80 billion at current prices (€150 billion at 2025 prices). Given that every taxpayer and consumer will have contributed to the Fund, what guarantees can be offered that payments out of the Fund after 2025 will be equitably distributed and not skewed towards increasingly unsustainable, unfunded "gold-plated" pensions for politicians and the public sector at the expense of much more numerous, poorly pensioned citizens in the private sector?

For example, the NPRF has indicated that public service pension costs will reach 3.7% of GDP by mid-century while social welfare pensions for a far larger number of people will only rise to 10.1%. 

As contributors to the Fund, we should be given absolute assurances that future governments will not treat the Fund as a massive "slush fund" to support vested interests as done with decentralisation, benchmarking etc.

Lead letter published in Irish Times on 26th July 2008.

Here are three proposals which could help negotiations on a new national wage agreement, claw back some of the excesses of the Celtic Tiger, improve equity within society, generate additional funds for the Exchequer, and enhance national competitiveness:

1. Apply wage increases under the next agreement on a sliding scale, for example, 3% p.a. on the first €30,000, 2% on the next thirty and 1% on the balance. As wage increases, in the absence of growth, are mainly intended to compensate for basic cost increases, there is no case for automatically offering the same proportional increases to those already enjoying high incomes. 
2. Either introduce an additional tax rate (say 45%) for those earning over, say, €100,000 or ensure that those on the 41% rate actually pay tax at that rate on their incremental earnings by scaling back allowances for "top-hat" pensions, investments etc. It is inequitable that someone earning €60,000 a year pays tax at 41% while a person earning five times more can pay tax at a lower effective rate.
3. Drop the standard VAT rate to, say, 18%. This would reduce the cost of living and help redress the imbalance between low direct taxes (which benefit the better off) and indirect taxes which fall most heavily on the less well off.

The figures are illustrative but basic analysis would identify the ideal combination to achieve all the aforementioned objectives.

Lead letter published in the Irish Times on 28th June 2008.

Dr X's call for a pay freeze (4th May7 2008) is unlikely to secure much support in the talks on a new national wage agreement on account of our high inflation etc. However, here are three proposals which taken together could enhance national competitiveness, protect living standards, claw back some excesses of the Celtic Tiger, improve equity within society and generate additional funds for the Exchequer:

1. Wage increases under the next wage agreement should be applied on a sliding scale e.g. 3% p.a. on the first €30,000, 2% on the next thirty and 1% on the balance. As wage increases are mainly intended to compensate for basic cost increases, there is no case for automatically offering the same proportional increases to those already enjoying high incomes. 
   
   
2. Either introduce an additional higher tax rate (say 45%) for those earning over, say, €100,000 or ensure that those on the 41% rate actually pay tax at that rate on their incremental earnings by scaling back allowances for "top-hat" pensions, investments etc. It is anomalous that someone earning €60,000 a year pays tax at 41% while a person earning five times more can pay tax at a much lower effective rate.
   
   
3. Lower the standard VAT rate to, say, 19%. This would reduce the cost of living and help redress the imbalance between low direct taxes (which benefit the better off) and indirect taxes which fall most heavily on the less well off.

Figures are illustrative but basic financial modelling would identify the ideal combination to meet all the aforementioned objectives which, presumably, are reasonable and desirable.

Lead letter published in the Sunday Business Post on 11th May 2008.

I wish to link Minister Dempsey claim that the Exchequer doesn't have a "red cent" for a much needed hospital in the north east to Richard Curran's report (6th April) that the National Pension Reserve Fund is the 15th largest sovereign investment fund and one of the few funds not financed by rising oil and commodity revenues.

The National Pension Reserve Fund secures 1% of GNP each year to help fund pensions after 2025. Valued at €21.3 billion at end 2007, it lost 1.8% of its value in the final quarter of 2007 and probably lost a multiple of this in the most recent quarter. More discerningly, the Fund, as recently as December 2007, was increasing its investments in volatile emerging markets, property and overseas private equity from 7% to 21% of the Fund's overall value by end 2009.

All this begs the question as to why the Government is borrowing well over a billion euro a year specifically for the Fund to make risky overseas investments and, at the same time, deploying expensive Private-Public Partnerships and massive tax breaks to help finance critical national projects. This is analogous to a heavily-mortgaged householder borrowing further money to invest in risky overseas shares for pension purposes while using a reduced salary to pay a premium price for essential roof work on top of an ongoing annual toll to the contractor.

This makes absolutely no financial or economic sense. Surely it would be better to legislate a "contributions holiday" for the Fund and divert future payments €1.6 billion a year of "red cents") towards much-needed, major infrastructural projects that could be progressed more quickly and kept in public ownership where they ultimately belong.

This letter was published in the Sunday Business Post on 13th April 2008.

One of the most troubling things about the Taoiseach's resignation has been the headlines in the international media which used words like resignation, scandal, payments, allegations in various combinations. This damage to our reputation must be urgently addressed by the incoming Taoiseach along the following lines:

1. Take the long overdue Ethics Bill in the current Dail session.
2. Introduce legislation to protect all whistle blowers in lieu of the current patchwork sectoral approach.
3. Roll back changes and charges relating to Freedom of Information and broaden its coverage.
4. Give more powers to Dail committees to conduct investigations along the lines of the Public Accounts Committee.
5. Establish a Dail Committee to confirm all significant Government appointments to State boards etc.
6. Preclude Ministers from signing non-essential orders or making appointments once an election has been called.
7. Clear up all the obvious flaws governing donations to politicians before and during elections.
8. Follow up on the Standards in Public Office Commission's recommendations.
9. Require that the accounts of political parties be audited and placed in the public domain.
   

These measures would kick start the process of restoring the electorate's confidence in the political system and politicians.

Letter published in the Irish Times on 5th April 2008. 

The most unsettling thing about the Taoiseach and his finances is the failure of judgement being displayed by the governing parties. The Taoiseach should have been "urged" to step aside long ago to facilitate due process and to avoid distracting from effective government of the country. Instead, ministers sat on their hands while burying heads in the sand.

In fairness, the Taoiseach has been a victim of the "no resign under any circumstances" syndrome which permeates Irish politics. A higher standard would have allowed him to step aside with no imputation of wrongdoing and to fight his corner with greater freedom. As a consequence, the country is now being run, if that word can be used loosely, by a distracted government which places parties first, shirks collective cabinet responsibility and betrays the electorate's trust. How can ordinary citizens register their disgust other than by voting No in June?

Letter published in the Irish Times on 2nd April 2008.

Following their recent donations, is there any chance that our philanthropic tax exiles will start donating to the Collector-General instead of using Pay As You Wish to salve their consciences and garner publicity?

Letter published in the Irish Times on 27th March 2008.

When plans for the the HSE were formally announced by Ministers Martin and McCreevy in June 2003 they proposed to rationalise agencies, manage the health service as a national entity, reform the hospitals sector, improve policy development and oversight, ensure quality and effectiveness of care, devolve responsibility, and improve the planning and delivery of service.

Five years later, the Fitzgerald report on issues arising from the Review of Breast Radiology Services at the Midland Hospital profiled a dysfunctional management structure and concluded that "fundamentally the problems arose from systemic weaknesses of governance, management, and communication for dealing with critical situations ...".

It cannot be claimed that there were no external warnings about structural problems in the HSE. In a review of senior posts after the HSE's establishment in 2005, the Review Body on Higher Remuneration found "that there was a lack of clarity at this stage about the future content of jobs. We are aware also of proposed alterations to the current structure which may result in changes in elements of the roles being exercised at present with implications for the extent of management responsibilities and other factors which are central to any evaluation of the jobs".

When revisiting the matter in its September 2007 report, the Review Body stated that "there is still some lack of clarity about the precise direction and reporting relationships of some of the jobs we examined and this made it difficult to evaluate them. We concluded that there is still an element of evolution about some of the management posts. At this stage in the development of the HSE we would have expected to find a clearer and more stable organisation structure. We would urge the management of the HSE to address this issue as a matter of urgency".

With the Minister, Department and HSE all wringing their hands with concern and simultaneously washing their hands of real responsibility and appearing to lack the will or authority to make long overdue root and branch changes, it is easy to see why the HSE is having problems.

Aside from rereading the Prospectus and Brennan reports which set out roadmaps for the HSE, they would do well to also check out Machiavelli on implementing change and Jack Welsh on delayering and lean management.

The article "Why public-private partnerships work" (2nd March 2008, Sunday Business Post) included a picture captioned  "West-Link Toll bridge: an example of a successful public-private partnership in action". Successful for  who? Certainly not for the users of the M50 who, for years, have paid through the nose to queue at the toll or for the taxpayer who has been obliged to pay hundreds of millions to terminate the partnership.

Continuing use of PPPs and provision of massive tax breaks to developers, especially in the health service, are very hard to justify when the Government is borrowing well over a billion euro a year to invest in the National Pension Reserve Fund for onward investment in thousands of overseas companies and funds. This fund, valued at €21.3 billion at end 2007, lost 1.8% in the last quarter of 2007 and has probably lost a multiple of that in the current quarter. 

Perhaps more disconcerting is the fact that as recently as December last, the NPRF was increasing its investments in emerging markets, property and private equity from 7% of the fund's overall value to 23% by end 2009. No doubt these declining markets will recover but, in the meantime, we will have given the NPRF billions of borrowed money for risky investments and simultaneously provided huge tax breaks to developers and handed over critical public infrastructure to PPPs. Why?

Having recently secured very large salary increases, the Taoiseach and Ministers have been exhorting everyone else to accept realistic pay increases to help maintain our international competitiveness. Well, here is how our TDs compare with their opposite numbers in the UK, our main trading partner:

• The basic salary for a TD is €97,747 compared with €78,588 (£60,277) for a MP.
  
  
• The Dail sits for about 95 days a year in contrast to 150+ for Westminster.

Based on the foregoing, and ignoring the fact that MPs serve much bigger constituencies, the basic salary cost per sitting day for a TD is about €1,028, double that for a MP €524). Maybe the Ceann Comhairle and some TDs could take a day trip to Westminster during the Easter recess to see how to instigate a four day, forty week year.

On Friday's Morning Ireland Senator Mansergh compared the Taoiseach's appearance at Mahon to an aircraft in turbulence coming in to safely land. Others would view it as a catastrophic crash landing happening in (very) slow motion.

In the light of their sustained attacks on Mahon, it is clear that Fianna Fail and its ministers are making a major error of political judgement and, as always, have placed their party ahead of the country. It is also evident that the Greens and PDs have no courage or convictions and lack any moral standard.

In the light of this, how can the electorate trust the Government's judgement on other matters such as the Lisbon Treaty or their competence to manage our slowing economy?

Letter published in the Irish Times on 23rd Febraury 2008.

The recent reports on benchmarking and higher remuneration in the public sector have raised basic issues about equity and fairness.

First, the Benchmarking Body used a 12% provision while the Higher Remuneration Body used 15% when assessing the value of pensions. These averages have greatly distorted assessments. For example, the percentage applicable to a lowly paid clerical officer would be very different to that for a Garda who can retire at 50 on full pension, or to the Director General of a government department.

Second, Benchmarking II produced evidence that public sector employees were paid a salary premium (averaging 8-10%) on a comparable basis to private sector employees while working fewer hours back in 2003. This was prior to Benchmarking I payments. If account is taken of the resultant benchmark payments (averaging 9%), the additional value of pensions (12%+) and shorter hours worked and longer holidays (say, 10% difference), then the current pay premium for public sector employees could be as high as 40%. The benchmarking report was silent on this and only said that "public sector salaries compare well with the private sector". It would have been useful to have indicated 'how well'.

Third, the cost of Benchmarking I is often quoted in terms of a cost per year. It should be borne in mind that this cost recurs and increases each year and that the cost of Benchmarking I could exceed �6 billion to date. As indicated above, it is doubtful whether Benchmarking I should have been paid in the first instance and there is little to suggest it resulted in any worthwhile improvements in services.

Fourth, it was erroneous for the Higher Remuneration and Benchmarking bodies to confine themselves to comparisons between the domestic private and public sectors. Account should also have been taken of public sector pay patterns in other similar countries where it would be easy to make directly relevant comparisons. This might have helped ensure that, in the interests of international competitiveness, our Taoiseach, TDs and top managers and professionals in the public sector are paid salaries appropriate to a country with a population of four million people.

Subject to the foregoing, Benchmarking II comes across as a far more transparent assessment than it predecessor. It would be a pity if its approach to establishing relativities and comparisons was rejected simply because it did not deliver for the public sector on this occasion.

Lead letter published in the Sunday Business Post on 27th January 2008.

In the context of providing Irish aid to Africa, your correspondent Mr X (Friday 14th) queried whether Ireland would have make better use of the billions received from the EU if this had been administered by EU-appointed managers rather than by our own Government.

For many people, the answer would have been a definite yes. The time delays might have been shorter, the cost overruns lower and the herd of white elephants smaller.

Letter published in the Irish Times on 19th December 2007.

Instead of tinkering with stamp duty, the Government, as advocated by your correspondent Mr X (3rd December 2007 and July 2006), should immediately implement the Kenny report to limit profits on building land. It should also dig up the All Party Committee on the Constitution's progress report on private property which, no doubt, it will find buried under a tent in Galway.

The magnitude of profits made by the building industry are mind blowing. Over the ten years to end 2006, 608,000 new houses were completed and average annual prices increased by 199% from €102,000 to €306,000. On this basis, the cumulative value of new house sales over the decade was €131 billion.

During this same period, building costs increased by 61%. If land and other costs and profits had only risen in line with building costs over the decade then the average price of a house would have hit €164,000 in 2006 and the cumulative value of sales over the ten years would have been just €86 billion, a difference of €45 billion. After allowing for VAT of €8 billion, the residual difference of €37 billion is largely attributable to profits for land owners and builders.

On this basis, about one-third of future mortgage repayments by house buyers will be used to pay for these extraordinary profits. It should not be ignored that financial institutions have also profited as they have lent far more than strictly necessary. Likewise, the exchequer, through stamp duty, and a raft of service providers including brokers, insurance companies, solicitors and auctioneers have benefited from this windfall.

In addition to being burdened by excessive borrowings, many recent purchasers have had to purchase lower grade accommodation, live in less accessible locations, work harder and longer, and demand higher earning to pay their inflated mortgages. This has disrupted communities, reduced leisure time and living standards, and impacted on national competitiveness and long term growth prospects.

It is ironic that having sought a reduction in stamp duty on the grounds that it would stimulate the market, builders have ignored the fact that dropping overblown prices would have a much more significant impact on demand.

Lead letter published in the Irish Times on 7th December 2007.

As is evident from your letters' page, opposition to co-locating private with public hospitals refuses to go away.

It was clear before the general election that key ministers had no idea about the cost of co-location. Furthermore, the Minister for Finance, who should know better, seemed to equate its cost with the the level of tax foregone. Conveniently, he ignored the ongoing costs that will arise due to duplication of activities and resources, the operation of two separate management systems on the same site and, most critically the premium needed to cover future profits of the developers of the co-located hospitals.

In the long run, these items will be far more significant than the initial tax breaks. In addition, private health insurance subscribers will face substantial additional premiums and, at the same time, public hospitals will encounter substantial reductions in revenue to be funded by taxpayers. This is classic "lose-lose" rather than "win-win".

The Government's mandate has been to fix the health service - not to break it by allowing the private sector to selectively cherry-pick profitable niches. Valuable time and MANY LIVES have been lost as a consequence of the single-minded pursuit of this ideologically-driven approach and the opportunity to develop a single-tier, public system could be lost for at least a generation.

Instead of pursuing privatisation by stealth and hiding behind task forces and reports, the Government should, even at this late stage, ditch this warped PD ideology and start tackling the very real and obvious issues linked to management, staffing and resources. If this had been done much earlier in the ten-year life of this government, we could have reached, by now, a situation where the end of waiting lists would be in sight and the need for private heath insurance as a method of queue jumping would have diminished.

Letter published in the Irish Times on 24th November 2007.

I disagree that cabinet members should wear L-plates as they seem very competent at parking issues, doing U-turns, overtaking everybody, reversing positions, using airbags, driving in bus lanes, straddling dual carriageways, using fog lights, blowing the horn and driving on both left/right sides.

Admittedly, they are not so good at route planning, driving straight, obeying red lights, negotiating roundabouts, handling slippery conditions, making clear signals and emergency stops.

Letter published in the Irish Times on 22nd November 2007.

It is clear from the reaction to the recent Report by the Review Body on Higher Remuneration that its approach of comparing public sector salaries with the private sector is inadequate. Why should Irish Secretaries General be paid more than their equivalents in almost every other country? If TD salaries are very high by international standards and linked to those of Principal Officers, what does this say about salaries at middle levels in the Irish public sector?  Buried in the Review Body's report is mention of a recent survey, covering 13 countries, that indicated that the remuneration of office holders in all the countries is WELL BELOW (my emphasis) below that of jobs of comparable weight in the private sector. Why should Ireland be so different?

It will be interesting to see if the current review by the OECD of the Irish public sector will include salary comparisons when it benchmarks the Irish public sector against other comparable countries. If it doesn't do this, how can it hope to assess effectiveness and performance given that pay and pensions account for the bulk of public expenditure.

Aside from Review Body awards and benchmarking, the main driver of politician and public sector pay has been the various national agreements which appear to mainly benefit the public sector. Because these agreements provide percentage increases across the board, workers at the lower end of the scale only receive small monetary increases and the gap between top and bottom salaries gets wider on an exponential basis. Is it any wonder that, notwithstanding the smallness of the State, our political and administrative leaders are, thanks to these percentage increases, amongst the best paid in the world?

For the future, the Review Body must be instructed by the Government to take account of comparable public sector salaries in other EU countries and national agreements should make provision for percentage increases to be applied on a sliding scale so that the lowest paid get the largest percentage increases.

Lead letter published in the Irish Times on 7th November 2008.

How can a prospective salary of €310,000 for the Taoiseach be justified when the UK's Prime Minister only earns €270,000 (€187,611) and the US President gets €281,700 ($400,000) ? Is it any wonder that Ireland is losing its competitiveness and public sector costs are surging when people at the top so blatantly ignore the need for pay restraint.

Letter published in the Irish Times on 30th October 2007.

Cliff Taylor's item about "Balancing the Books" (Sunday, 7th October) indicates that the Government will need to borrow about �1.5 billion this year to finance day-to-day expenditure. This is almost equivalent to the amount to be invested this year in the National Pension Reserve Fund and begs some basic issues about the Fund's operation and direction:

1. What is the economic justification for borrowing money simply to invest in overseas equities to fund future pensions? As recent market volatility has shown, this is a "good times" strategy that would be completely unsustainable in the event of any serious international or national slowdown or rise in inflation.
2. Surely a better return could be secured for the nation if these borrowings were invested in much-needed local infrastructure, or used to displace profit-seeking private funds going into private-public partnerships, or used to bring forward projects which could encounter above-average inflation?
3. The Fund is currently worth about 21 billion euro and will continue to grow rapidly as profits are generated and 1% of GNP is invested each year. As every taxpayer and consumer will have contributed to the Fund, what guarantees can be given that payments will be equitably distributed and not skewed towards increasingly unsustainable and unfunded pensions for politicians and the public sector at the expense of much more numerous, poorly pensioned citizens in the private sector? For example, the NPRF indicates that public service pension costs will reach 3.7% by mid-century while social welfare pensions payable to a far larger number of people will only rise to 10.1%.

As contributors to the Fund, we should be given absolute assurances that future Ministers will not treat the NPRF as a massive "slush fund" to support vested interests as done regularly in the past. The classic examples being decentralisation, benchmarking and the distribution of National Lottery funds.

Letter published in the Sunday Business Post on 21st October 2007.

Does projected economic growth of 5% a year mean, for example, that we'll have:

• 5% more cars on the road each year for the foreseeable future?
• 5% more children trying to get into schools every year?
• 5% more people crowding each year into our hospitals?

Will this growth continue to undermine our national competitiveness as has happened during the recent years? If so, the net result will be that cars will be barely usable due to congestion, more children won't get places in schools, the health service will implode and no one will want our overpriced exports. Surely this is a Celtic nightmare and absolutely unsustainable or undesirable.

Will some politician please stand up and articulate a vision of Ireland which allows the country to consolidate and draw economic breath.

Following the German Ambassador's remarks about salary levels for senior civil servants and consultants, is there any chance of the Review Body on Higher Remuneration in the Public Sector benchmarking Irish salaries against comparable jobs in other countries? The grounds being that if our salary levels at the top are not comparable, there is little prospect of the economy as a whole being competitive.

Letter publsihed in the Irish Times on 24th September 2007.

Why should Aer Lingus be expected to adhere to the Government's National Spatial Policy when the Government's own decentralisation plans have ignored it?

Letter published in the Sunday Business POst on 26th August 2007.

Two major Irish banks have recently suggested that interest rates in the euro zone could peak before the end of this year at 4.25%. How much credence can be given to this when no one can possibly foretell what will happen to Iraq, German economy, oil prices, US dollar, Russian gas supplies and so on? Furthermore, interest rate trends does not suggest any peaking of euro rates as might be the case for US rates. Do these banks know something the rest of us don't know or do they just have thicker brass necks or bigger crystal balls?

Letter published in the Sunday Business Post on 29th July 2007. 

Only weeks after stuffing the electorate with promises of lower taxes and better services, the Taoiseach tells us (7th June) that we are entering a period of challenging economic conditions and that it is important to focus on restoring and renewing competitiveness across all dimensions. Isn't it really strange that this is the second occasion that conditions have deteriorated immediately following an election?

In fact, absolutely nothing has altered during the past month to justify this about face. However, if the Taoiseach believes what he says then he could lead by example and slash the inflated salaries of ministers/TDs who are amongst the best paid in the World. He should then shake up the public sector to bring it into line with performance and pay norms in the private sector and ensure that lump sum wage increases rather than socially-device percentage increases are applied in future national wage agreements.

Unless measures along these lines are taken to restore our increasingly unbalanced, uncompetitiveness, overpriced and overborrowed economy, we will see a continuing deterioration. Action now would be less painful than the appalling prospect of having to abandon the euro for a floating Irish pound in order to recover the levers of economic management. This would improve competitiveness but at the expense of even higher prices and interest rates.

Letter published in the Irish Times on 13th June 2007. 

Minister Martin's reported willingness to consider opt-out clauses in future national wage agreements for exporting businesses is a bit rich coming from a minister who had more pay rises in recent years than most people in the private sector have had hot dinners.

This cop-out would allow the public and non-traded sectors which are immune to economic realities and real competitive pressures to continue to enjoy unsustainable pay increases. As a consequence our national competitiveness would be further reduced and with corporate tax rates within the EU likely to converge we would see an eastward flight of investment from Ireland. In these circumstances, the only solution may be to abandon the euro and revert to a floating Irish pound. This would improve competitiveness but at the expense of higher prices and interest rates.

The bottom line is that if national agreements are not suitable for the traded sector then they are inappropriate for everyone.

Mr X quoted EU statistics (Letters, 5th June) to suggest that Ireland has become more equitable since Bertie Ahern came to power. He indicated that the gap between the incomes of the top 20% of the population and bottom 20% declined from 5.1 times to 5.0 between 1995 and 2005, an improvement of 2%.

It is a pity he did not look more closely into the figures as he would have found that EU countries improved their overall score over the same period from 5.1 to 4.8, a 6% improvement; Ireland's score improved by 12% from 5.1 in 1995 to 4.5 in 2001 and deteriorated by 11% to 5.0 over the subsequent four years; and Ireland had the tenth widest gap between rich and poor out of 28 countries in 2005.

Ireland's score would need to fall to 4 to match the equalities in most Northern Europe states. At the current rate of progress, this will take a hundred years.

Letter published in the Irish Times on 7th June 2007.